JOINT VIRTUAL MEETING
CHEIRON AND ESHHS
JULY 9 – 11, 2020

International Society for the History of the Behavioral and Social Sciences (Cheiron) &
European Society for the History of the Human Sciences (ESHHS)

PROGRAM
**Program Chairs:** Kim Hajek, Narrative Science Project, London School of Economics and Political Science.

Ann Johnson, Department of Psychology, University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, MN.

**Acknowledgements:**

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**Thursday July 9**

**WELCOME:** Jannes Eshuis and David Robinson.

**Mixed Session: Human Sciences and Social Reform**

**Chair:** Ann Johnson  
**Zoom chat moderator:** Martin Wieser

**LIVE TALK + DISCUSSION:** *Psychologization in and through the women’s movement: Consciousness-raising in Austrian feminist activism in 1970s.*  
Nina Franke & Nora Ruck

**LIVE TALK + DISCUSSION:** *Franco Basaglia, the “New psychiatry” and the refusal of psychotherapy.*  
Andrea Romano & Renato Foschi

**DISCUSSION OF UPLOADED PAPER:** *Sociology and Social Ethics at Harvard: The Department that Might Have Been.*  
Lawrence T. Nichols

*Coffee Break*

**Cheiron Book Prize Session:** *Empathy: A History by Susan Lanzoni*  
**Chair:** Daniela Barberis  
**Zoom chat moderator:**

**Book Prize Committee citation:** Cheiron (The International Society for the History of Behavioral and Social Sciences) awards the 2020 Cheiron Book Prize to Susan Lanzoni, (Harvard University’s School of Continuing Education) for *Empathy: A History* (Yale University Press, 2018).
In this far-reaching and wide-ranging exploration of the concept of empathy, Susan Lanzoni takes her readers through a complex history of branching uses and meanings, arriving at the pervasive yet vague notion of empathy current today.

Empathy first appeared in the English language in the early twentieth century as a translation of the German word *Einfühlung* (“in-feeling”)—originally a concept in German aesthetics that described projecting the self into artistic objects. This early projective meaning was eventually transformed into its opposite, becoming a psychological concept defined as the capacity to accurately predict another’s opinion or preference. Lanzoni follows empathy’s varying definitions, conceptualizations and practices through history, chronicling its use in the fields of psychology, social science, politics, psychiatry, psychotherapy, advertising and media, ending in the neuroscience of today. The meaning and scope of empathy was vigorously debated in each of these fields—and as interest in the topic grew, its meanings proliferated.

Lanzoni navigates this historical complexity by painting vivid scenes and settings in which empathy was taken up and engaged, starting each of the nine chapters with a period vignette that unveils empathy as understood and performed by social scientists and psychologists. Through all these transformations, a continuity is evident in the envisaging of empathy as a power of the self to shape its relation to the world: to enter into alien forms, to transform art objects, to inhabit other realities or to engage the experiences of others. It puts our self-containment into question and promises connection. Lanzoni offers us an enlightening exploration of a central, and timely, concept.

*Members of the 2020 Cheiron Book Prize Committee: Kate Harper, Katharine Milar, Fred Weizmann and Daniela Barberis (chair).*

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**Friday July 10**

**Live Session: Intellectual Influences & Interdisciplinarity**

**Chair:** Kim Hajek  
**Zoom chat moderator:** Michael McGovern

**EACH PAPER INVOLVES LIVE TALK + DISCUSSION:**

*The Durkheimians and the Critique of “Biological Sociology”.*  
Daniela Barberis

*Unconscious Inferences in Experimental Psychology: Peirce and Wundt.*  
Claudia Cristalli

*Interdisciplinarity as an Editorial Strategy? The Case of the “Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences” (1930-1935).*  
Marie Linos

*Coffee Break*
**Live Session: Children as Moral Agents**

**Chair:** Jennifer Bazar  
**Zoom chat moderator:** Benjamin Wegner

EACH PAPER INVOLVES LIVE TALK + DISCUSSION:

- **Child’s Autonomy or Control? The Deployment of Behaviour Modification in Child Psychiatry, France, 1970s.**  
  Milana Aronov

- **Constructing the Moral Infant in American Medical and Scientific Discourse, 1850s- 1920s.**  
  Elisabeth Yang

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**Saturday July 11**

**Mixed Session: Cold War Psychology**

**Chair:** David Devonis  
**Zoom chat moderator:** Deborah Rowe

DISCUSSION OF UPLOADED PAPER:  
**Boris Parygin’s Personality Social Psychology.**  
Irina Mironenko

LIVE TALK + DISCUSSION:  
**Was Linda a Feminist? Nuclear Dread, Dual Process Theories, and the End of Cold War Cognition.**  
Michael Pettit

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**Coffee Break**

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**Mixed Session: The Personal Factor**

**Chair:** Larry Stern  
**Zoom chat moderator:** Alan Tjeltveit

LIVE TALK + DISCUSSION:  
**A Crisis of Spirit: How Philip Brickman Experienced and Confronted the 1970s Crisis in Social Psychology.**  
Benjamin Wegner.

DISCUSSION OF UPLOADED PAPER:  
**William McDougall and Psychoanalysis.**  
Sam Parkovnick

DISCUSSION OF UPLOADED POSTER:  
**A Memoir: Maslow and the Brandeis Psychology Department: 1962 through 1965.**  
Kenneth Feigenbaum
Nina Franke & Nora Ruck
Psychologization in and through the women’s movement: Consciousness-raising in Austrian feminist activism in 1970s.

In our paper we want to contribute to historical research on the relations between psychology and feminism by analyzing the psychologization of the women’s movement of the 1970s in Vienna, Austria. Scholars have tackled the relationship between psychology and feminism from two angles: On the one hand, historians of psychology, in particular, have asked about the impact feminism has had on psychology, for example on experimental psychology (Morawski & Agronick, 1991), psychotherapy (Brodsky, 1980; Kim & Rutherford, 2015), diagnostic practices (Dodd, 2015), and research areas and approaches (Crawford & Marecek, 1989; Eagly et al., 2012) both in North America and internationally (see Rutherford et al., 2011). Overall this line of research has been able to document, especially for North America and Great Britain, a notable presence of feminist psychology that can be evidenced in sections in professional organizations, conferences, journals, textbooks, handbooks, and university courses dedicated to the advancement of feminist perspectives within psychology. Nevertheless, these studies have also demonstrated the various ways in which “psychology defin[es] the limits of the relationship and keep[s] feminism firmly in its place” (Crawford, 1998, S. 62). On the other hand, historians and social scientists have studied the influence psychology has had especially on feminist activism since the late 1960s and the 1970s. Some have analyzed this impact as an example of larger psychologization processes in the second half of the twentieth century. The term “psychologization” has been developed – not least from the margins of the discipline itself – in order to critically assess the effects of psychological expert discourse on society and on subjectivity. It can be defined as the „spreading of the discourse of psychology beyond its alleged disciplinary borders” (de Vos, 2014 p. 1547). The inception of the concept is intricately connected with a critique of ‘therapeutic culture’ that developed from the late 1970s onwards. Eva Illouz (2008) has prominently argued that feminism played a significant role in the ascending of this “therapeutic worldview” (p. 2) because feminism and psychology both relied on similar schemas. Already in 1992, Ellen Herman pointed out that U. S. American second-wave feminism drew rather heavily on psychological theories and concepts. Like other activists of the New Left, they appropriated concepts especially from humanist Psychology in order to further a political agenda that included spiritual, cultural, and emotional dimensions of human existence.

In our paper we follow the lines along which some of the psychological concepts that were appropriated and developed mainly by North American activists traveled to the German speaking countries and were translated, adopted, and transformed by feminist activists in Vienna (Austria). In order to tackle the ways in which psychological expert discourse was adopted in
feminist discourse we analyze two of the major books used by so-called “self-awareness” or “communication groups” in Vienna: *Getting clear – Ein Therapiehandbuch für Frauen* (original title: *Getting clear: Body work for women*) by Anne Kent Rush (1973) and *Frauentherapie* (original title: *Feminism as therapy*) by Anica Vesel Mander and Anne Kent Rush (1974). The groups that relied on these books in their self-awareness or communication practices had started to developed in Vienna in 1972. They were modeled after the “consciousness-raising groups” that had originated in the U.S. and most of them were developed either in the context of autonomous women’s collectives or of so-called “folk high schools” (Volkshochschulen), i.e., institutions which aimed at low threshold adult education. Furthermore, we rely on oral history interviews with former participants of these groups in order to clarify the related question of the role psychological expert discourse played for these women’s lived experiences and subjectivities as they remember these today.

References:


Andrea Romano & Renato Foschi
Franco Basaglia, the “New psychiatry” and the refusal of psychotherapy.

The lecture that will be presented aims to highlight the reasons of the opposition to psychotherapy through the study of the primary sources of Basaglian literature.

The conditions of the patients in Italian psychiatric hospitals were similar to those of prisoners in penitentiaries until the Sixties, indeed these patients were registered in the criminal record. This procedure was withdrawn by Article 11 of the Act n.431, so-called “Mariotti Act”, in 1968. Several authors compared the institutional asylums to nazi concentration camps (Del Boca, 1966; Manacorda & Montella, 1977) and such comparison began to enter the collective imaginary. The transformation process of the psychiatric institution started from the psychiatric hospital of Gorizia in 1961 when a new director arrived: Franco Basaglia (1924 – 1980).

Influenced by the phenomenological approach Basaglia was inspired by the first therapeutic communities organized in Great Britain, firstly the Maxwell Jones (1907 – 1990) experience in Dingleton, then those of David Cooper (1931-1986) at Shenley Hospital and Kingsley Hall where, with Ronald Laing (1927 – 1989), inaugurated the first therapeutic community outside a psychiatric hospital. While differentiating his theory and practice from the British anti-psychiatry (Foschi & Innamorati, 2019), Basaglia returned subjectivity to the patients who had been considered objects by abolishing physical restraint, organizing meetings during which doctors, nurses and patients could freely challenge the institution and breaking down walls and gates that were previously impassable (Basaglia, 1973). The new concept of psychiatric care, formed during the Gorizia experiment, attracted the interest of journalists, intellectuals and artists and contributed to the formation of a common sensivity on the theme of freedom (Babini, 2009). Many Italian radical psychiatrists recognized in that new approach a model to follow (Foot, 2014). A real movement with the goal to break down the asylum institution grew around Basaglia. So he founded “Psichiatria democratica” to organize the movement in 1973. The deinstitutionalization of the asylums was achieved through the Law n. 180, in 1978. The emptying of asylums was gradual and it took about twenty years to complete the social inclusion of the patients.

This phenomenon, then identified as antipsychiatry, has been progressively defined with the term New Psychiatry (Bartolomei & Lombardo, 1977). The revolutionary idea of deinstitutionalization of the asylums directly inspired the 1968 Italian culture. In this context the radical psychiatry was permeated by the spirit of an ideal society open to new and flexible systems in contrast to the rigid hierarchies of the past. At the same time the anti-institutional topic became an “anti-specialized” criticism extended to the rejection of clinical psychology models, psychoanalysis and psychotherapy in the renewed concept of psychiatric care. According to Basaglia a specialist figure “manages to make the social inferiority of the excluded accepted” (1968, p.116). He also claimed that “there is a tendency […] towards a new psychiatry based on the psychotherapy approach to the patient, but one is still involved in a psychiatric reality linked to old positivistic schemes” (1973, p.11), and that “Italy […] is now ready to
welcome psychoanalysis, behaviorism, relational therapies etc. which – elsewhere – have left intact both the process of social exclusion and the asylum logic that justify it” (1979, p. 374).

Therefore it is evident that in new psychiatry there was several critical positions towards psychotherapy, some new psychiatrists were not adverse to use psychotherapies, especially the family approach, but some other like Basaglia clearly rejected psychotherapies. Our opinion is that this kind of refuse is a little-known aspect in the history of psy-disciplines and should be further investigated.

Bibliography:


**Lawrence T. Nichols**

**Sociology and Social Ethics at Harvard: The Department that Might Have Been**

The paper provides an historical analysis of a “road not taken” resulting from policy decisions at Harvard University between 1906 and 1931 regarding the shape and direction of social science. In 1906, President Charles William Eliot approved a Department of Social Ethics headed by the Reverend Francis Greenwood Peabody. This unit dealt with social problems and social policy from a Unitarian interpretation of the Christian Social Gospel, and it arguably preempted the
place of a department of sociology. The subsequent administration of President A. L. Lowell was less supportive, however, and Peabody’s retirement in 1913 led to a very unsettled situation. In response, Assistant Professor James Ford proposed in 1916 an expanded program of “sociology and social ethics.”

World War I disrupted university life, and Social Ethics was allowed to continue. In 1920 Lowell appointed Dr. Richard Clarke Cabot as chair of the department, and the unit’s situation improved. In 1927, however, the administration decided to move to a broadened field of “sociology and social ethics.” Lowell subsequently appointed Pitirim A. Sorokin in 1930 as the university’s first full professor of sociology, and Sorokin became chair of the Committee on Sociology and Social Ethics that was building a new curriculum.

The rise of sociology placed the survival of social ethics in doubt. Cabot and social psychologist Gordon W. Allport lobbied hard for the retention of a joint name and a joint unit, and the Dean of the Faculty, Clifford Moore was amenable. But Sorokin fiercely opposed this combination and the Lowell administration acceded, launching a Department of Sociology in 1931. Cabot and Ford were retained, but the administration’s decision made it clear that social ethics was expected ultimately to disappear.

This paper considers what might have happened if the alternate decision had been taken, and also how this might have affected later responses to social science at Harvard. A Department of Sociology and Social Ethics would presumably have retained the earlier focus on “social problems and social policy” and possibly also links to the field of social work. The department would have accorded a place of respect to Ford, an expert on housing problems. Researches by Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck on juvenile delinquency and criminal justice policy might also have been included. The combined department would have been receptive to Allport’s work on prejudice, as well as to that of Thomas Pettigrew on racism and race relations. Sociology and Social Ethics would also have been more supportive of Sorokin’s work on love and altruism than was the Department of Social Relations led by Talcott Parsons.

During the political upheavals of the 1960s, social science at Harvard was often accused of being detached and irrelevant. The university responded in part by creating a Richard Clarke Cabot Professorship of Social Ethics, with Gordon Allport as its first incumbent. This professorship would have fit naturally within a Department of Sociology and Social Ethics.

And all of this would have provided a basis for Harvard to develop what has recently been called “public sociology,” much of which is arguably an application of social ethics. Current work is generally no longer rooted in the traditional Christian Social Gospel, but, rather, in varieties of egalitarian ethics (e.g., “liberation sociology,” feminism, critical race theory, queer theory) or environmentalism or Buddhist sociology. Advocates of social ethics from a century ago might well feel vindicated by these developments. For “the department that might have been” has appeared, not only at Harvard but nationally and internationally. And it is the combination of sociology and social ethics—whether one approves or not—that is drawing many people into the field today.
Bibliography:


Daniela Barberis  
The Durkheimians and the Critique of “Biological Sociology”

My paper will focus on the response of the Durkheimian group to nineteenth century biological determinism and racial science. I will argue that the stance on the subject—taken by Durkheim individually and the Durkheimian group collectively—changed over time from one of acceptance to one of open critique and rejection. I will analyze the intellectual, social and political reasons for this shift.

Durkheim’s position on the use of biological concepts in sociology changed in the 1890s. In 1884, Durkheim had claimed that he was an evolutionist and that he saw Alfred Espinas, the senior representative of organicism in France, as “one of [their] own, and one of the most authoritative….”1 His dissertation, *The Division of Labor in Society*, made ample use of the organic analogy for society and was burdened with a heavily biological and mechanistic explanatory framework. For example, Durkheim drew a parallel between the sexual dimorphism of humans and the sexual division of labor, using the data of physical anthropology to show that biological differences between the sexes increased to the same degree as the differentiation of social roles. “Civilized” man and woman showed greater difference in their cranial capacity than their “primitive” counterparts and this corresponded to the “fact” that the social roles of men and women in primitive societies were much more similar. Durkheim used a study of crania by Le Bon to substantiate this argument.

By the time of the foundation of the journal *L’Année sociologique* in 1898, Durkheim had significantly altered his position and the journal campaigned against biological models for the social sciences. Célestin Bouglé, one of the most visible and influential members of the Durkheimian group during his lifetime and one of the most successful academically, led this critical endeavor. The Durkheimian change in stance, I will argue, was due to various factors: academic alliances (both to form the journal and sociological group and to distance it from academic rivals); political convictions (ranging from concerns about the effect of biological determinism on egalitarian democratic politics to concerns about the effects of Dreyfus affair); and changing conceptions of science and objectivity (coming to see endeavors such as anthroposociology as unscientific).

Furthermore, the first generation of Durkheimians were interested in the application of the teachings of sociology to the resolution of practical and philosophical problems. This meant that they hoped to make a concrete difference in the world through their intellectual work. Durkheim and Bouglé belonged to a generation that conceived science and knowledge in general as a propaedeutic to action. They came to see combatting the conceptions of biological determinism and racial science as increasingly urgent as it made its way into culture in the early 20th century.
Bibliography:

Claudia Cristalli
Unconscious Inferences in Experimental Psychology: Peirce and Wundt

Peirce’s early account of inquiry (1868-1878) has been considered often either “hopelessly psychologistic” or highly problematic because of “psychologistic-sounding” statements: interpreters either attack what they see as Peirce’s early disingenuity in mixing philosophy and psychology or try to explain the psychological bits away (Kasser 1999). My argument follows two lines in replying to this criticism:

1. Externally, I show that Peirce’s psychological discourse in the decade 188-78 follows closely formulations of Wilhelm Wundt. While being generally considered the founder of modern psychology, the early Wundt also thought (in 1862 and 1863) that the proper object of study of psychology is thought, and that thought is essentially inferential in its development. By putting thought at the centre, Wundt initially created a logical and philosophical psychology. This explains why Peirce could feel safe, in 1868, to endorse a completely inferential theory of cognition and to illustrate it with psychological facts. Peirce’s use of Wundt’s psychological claims does not make his epistemology psychologistic.

2. Internally, I show the connection between the inferential theory of perception detailed in Peirce’s Cognition essays and the notion of “social instinct” which appears in the Illustrations in the Logic of Science and which so long puzzled commentators (from Murphey [1961] 1993 to Misak 2004). While this notion has been also explained away as a kind of psychologism (called “sociologism”) which would further erode the tenability
of Peirce’s philosophical arguments, I argue that, if we take seriously Peirce’s claim that all thought develops through inferences, we will have to admit that (at least some of) our premises are picked before conscious reflection enters the stage. For these inferences, only at the social level a criticism, albeit indirect, of our premises becomes possible. The confrontation on one’s results with others can stimulate doubt; doubt sustains inquiry, and thus the revision of beliefs uncritically accepted. Eventually, the social principle would prompt us to provide a correction for trains of inferences which, from an individual perspective only, would appear as perfectly rational. Thus, the social principle is nothing but the application in the domain of conscious knowledge of the principles of the mediatedness and externality of knowledge which Peirce already associated to processes of perception in his 1868 essays.

Wundt abandoned his early inferentialist positions in his 1874 Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie. Peirce will continue to endorse an inferentialist account of perception, although with some breaks and afterthoughts (Bergman 2007). Thus, this investigation into the origins of Peirce’s theory of perception is a contribution towards a new assessment of Peirce’s thought and of the connections between pragmatism and post-Kantian experimental psychology more broadly.

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Marie Linos
Interdisciplinarity as an Editorial Strategy? The Case of the “Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences” (1930-1935).

It was in 1927 that the editorial adventure of the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences (ESS; Seligman, Johnson, 1930-1935) began when Edwin R. A. Seligman was appointed editor-in-
chief of this ambitious scientific enterprise which intended to establish itself as the fundamental and indispensable reference of the social sciences internationally. The result came eight years later in 1935 when the fifteenth and last volume of the ESS was published. The encyclopedia then consisted of thematic articles and short biographical notes, written by a group of 2000 researchers from all disciplines and mainly from Europe and the United States.

Considering its stated ambition and unprecedented scope, the ESS constitutes an actual observatory of social sciences in the interwar period that allows us to point out specificities and shared patterns of several disciplines labelled as “social sciences.” Yet, the ESS has not only been conceived as an academic enterprise coordinating a multiplicity of disciplines, it has produced a rhetoric insisting on the necessity to focus on the interrelations of social sciences. The preface of the ESS opens with these words from Edwin R. A. Seligman: “It is only in comparatively recent years that the interdependence of the social sciences has come to be recognized as a concept necessary to their progress.” (Seligman, Johnson, 1930). This preliminary statement infers that this project will give a special attention to interdisciplinarity, a concept many consider to be a post-World War II practice. Roberta Franck (1988) has observed that the social sciences through their organization stand out as a pioneer playing field for interdisciplinarity. These sciences seem thus to have played a specific role in the defining terms of interdisciplinarity even before the 1950s (Calhoun, Rhoten, 2010).

This paper aims to point out the different motivations behind the call of this ambitious scientific undertaking to focus on the interrelations of social sciences. Some of them are rather explicit, like the typical philosophical stance positing that the unity of knowledge is a necessary prerequisite to understand the social world. Calls to build a multi-faceted science to analyze the society are quite widespread in the last year of the 19th-century and the ESS can be seen as a legacy of these attempts. But other reasons can also be brought forward. Financial incentives can be taken into consideration as the major philanthropic foundations were keen to support projects that incorporated this interdisciplinary character (Seim, 2013). Another lead is given when considering the inextricable link between disciplinary and interdisciplinary work. Indeed, the claim to interdisciplinarity of the ESS must be understood considering the stakes of each specialty involved in this project. When adopting this perspective, we can see that interdisciplinarity seems to correspond to the agenda of some disciplines – those who will reveal to be the “dominant” ones in the ESS – to explore beyond the disciplinary borders in order to remake their own content on new bases and to shed light on some schools of thoughts or specific programs (sociological jurisprudence, institutional economics among others).

Through the specific lens of the ESS, this paper intends to illustrate how interdisciplinarity can be used both as a rhetoric and scientific tool to promote specific ideas within disciplines but also to make them more desirable alongside specific actors. The paper will therefore argue that interdisciplinarity, as it was mobilized in the ESS, was not only a by-product of the post-war scientific world designed to criticize the way knowledge was produced, but rather a strategic and philosophical practice closely entrenched in the 19th-century discipline-making system of knowledge organization, as much as the reflect of an idiosyncratic taxonomy.
within the academia. Interdisciplinarity, according to this perspective, points out to the impossible neutral stance of scientific practice and allows us to think on its tactical use through time.

**Bibliography:**


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Milana Aronov

**Child’s Autonomy or Control? The Deployment of Behaviour Modification in Child Psychiatry, France, 1970s.**

This paper explores the trajectory of behavioural approaches in relation to child psychiatry in France during the 1970s, from their first therapeutic applications to the role they played in the rise of new conceptions of "psychiatric disability”.

In France, despite ethical objections to behaviourism as being “controlling”, behavioural approaches have permeated a variety of areas by the 1970s and 1980s, from child psychiatry
interested in developmental disabilities to family- and special education. From the 1960s onwards, the cross-fertilization of psychiatry and experimental psychology that took place at the Salpêtrière and Saint-Anne hospitals provided a favourable context for the development of “operant conditioning” techniques (Seiden, 1994). Professionals (e.g., educators, child psychiatrists, physicians, nurses) who endorsed the use of behavioural techniques found support from some public administrations and some parents associations of "maladjusted" children. Assuming that human behaviour is primarily governed by rules of learning and habit, these latter proved to be ambivalent about what counts as voluntary or reflex behaviour and challenged the notion of "mental illness" as a meaningful entity (Magerotte, 1984; Lelord, 1998). Against the 1970s backdrop of a significant spread of Lacanian-inspired conceptions of the child and fatherhood and publicization of the idea of “Oedipus complex” outside the academic and therapeutic fields (Tort, 2007; Robcis, 2016), many psychiatrists and psychoanalysts referred to behavioural approaches as a form of denial of child's individuality and freedom, and as techniques overall questioning the intellectual and moral viability of the 'psy' professionals. Some of them also condemned the very use of these techniques in health facilities, as they were said to encourage forms of child abuse and "institutional violence" (Binder, 1982). These criticisms stood nonetheless at the point of convergence of important developments in the understanding and experience of both parenting and “psychiatric disabilities”: firstly, the removal from the Civil Code of the notion of “chef de famille” and the introduction of the one of “parental authority”, which gave mothers more equal rights in familial decisions relating to children (JORF, 1970); secondly, the controversial introduction of the term "handicap" in French legislation in 1975 (Henckes, 2009, 2012). Numerous parents indeed saw an opportunity in behavioural techniques to improve children’s abilities to act upon their personal environments (Sésame, 1979), and thus provided a responsive audience for psychologists and psychiatrists who were already involved into diversifying the applications of behavioural techniques, from using these to modify children’s behaviours, towards developing ways of training parents as therapists of their own children (Miller, Viala, Rivière, 1977; Lambert, 1980).

Focusing on the history of behavioural approaches in relation to child psychiatry and experimental psychology in the 1970s France, this paper proposes to contribute to the historical scholarship that investigates the applied forms of behavioural psychology (Baistow, 2000, 2001; Rutherford, 2009), and the uneasy development and uses of behaviourism in France (Amouroux, 2017; Amouroux, Zaslavski, 2020). Drawing on the scientific literature produced by psychologists and psychiatrists and on archives of parents association of “maladjusted children”, I will examine how these ‘psy’ professionals problematized children’s and parents’ attention mechanisms within the clinical space, and incorporated the ethical criticisms of ‘control’ that were levelled at them (Agathon, 1974, 1982). My aim here is twofold: firstly, to demonstrate the changing nature of behavioural discourses that shifted from an emphasis on modify the behaviour of children by acting on their environment, towards children’s and parents' abilities to act on their own conduct (Lelord, 1998). Secondly, to consider how children were understood to see their world by these ‘psy’ professionals, and how the latter have grasped and integrated the
notions of child autonomy, parental authority and affection (Michaux, 1972). In this process, I will suggest that although behavioural approaches did not supplant Lacanian academic conceptions of the child and fatherhood in the 1970s, the versions of personal abilities that underpinned them did play a major role in stabilizing new understanding of disability and mental disorder, increasingly conceived from that decade onwards outside of a therapeutic relationship and hospitalization (Roca, 2004; Henckes, 2009, 2012).

Bibliography:


Elisabeth Yang

**Constructing the Moral Infant in American Medical and Scientific Discourse, 1850s–1920s.**

In this paper, I explore the philosophical and social constructions of the moral infant in American medical and scientific discourse from the 1850s to the 1920s. While historians, sociologists, and literary scholars have written extensively on the history of child-rearing and child health, very little has been done that focuses on the history of infants as moral agents and persons. I investigate conceptualizations of the moral agency and personhood of infants in nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century American medical texts and child-rearing advice literature. Integral to the narrative of the moral infant in the history of American medicine and science are the underlying conceptions of personhood, agency, and morality that physicians and scientists invoked in their counsel toward parents, particularly mothers, within the guild of scientific child-rearing. Storying the moral infant involves an analysis of the interface of hegemonic religious, scientific, and philosophical concepts aimed to define the moral infant in America as Darwinian approaches to child development and the mechanization of the child’s body pervaded medical, scientific and pedagogical thought during the late nineteenth- and into the early twentieth-century. I examine five types of texts: 1) child-rearing manuals authored by physicians and addressed to mothers; 2) medical treatises written by and for physicians; 3) scientific literature authored by physiologists and psychologists on the topics of moral infancy and development; 4) magazines and newspapers; and 5) baby books.

Through textual and Foucauldian discourse analyses, I aim to reveal the hegemonic struggle to define the “moral,” “healthy” infant, “medicine,” and the identities of the subjects and objects of moralizing and normalizing discourse. First, I examine the ways in which Western medicine, through the annals of domestic hygiene and child-rearing, privileged the experience of the Western masculine elite as it maintains universals about truth, freedom, human nature, morality, and health; Second, I chart the beginnings of a gradual shift in authority over infants’ morality from religion to science. The child-rearing manuals are artifacts of what Bryan S. Turner argues was the secularization and the displacement of the Church by the medical profession as an authority in issues of morality and social relations.2 I consider how the
medicalization of motherhood during the nineteenth century exhibits how mothers negotiated Christianity and science in the moralization of their infants. Physicians’ allusions to Judeo-Christian principles, ideals of health and morality, and anthropology within the child-rearing advice literature and medical texts suggest the confluence of Protestantism and evolutionary science; and third, I consider the political dimensions of American pediatrics and the child psychosciences prevalent in various forms of infant health literature addressed to middle-class mothers and circulated within the medical and scientific community.

I investigate these issues during a period in American history that saw the child not only as an object of sentimental interest but as an object of political and scientific interests that marked the emergence of scientific motherhood, American paediatrics and the child psychosciences. Exposing the epistemic culture and constellations of power (religious, political, and philosophical) involved in the medicalization of infants’ morality raises an awareness of a tacit field of knowledge that directs our medical and scientific treatment and valuation of infants. Moreover, to interrogate basic presuppositions about “morality,” “medicine,” “health,” and an “American” in light of infants can reveal, as John Wall puts it, “suppressed dimensions of meaning and relations” and engender a more nuanced and rich account of the human condition and experience.

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Irina Mironenko  
Boris Parygin’s Personality Social Psychology.

The history of psychology in Russia remains largely obscure for international scholars. One of the least known areas is the history of Russian social psychology, which has a distinct story within the general context of the development of Soviet psychology. It differs from the history of the Soviet “mainstream”—Activity Theory, which characterized the development of general psychology.

Pre-Soviet Russian scholars established some authentic trends in social psychology that focused on the social phenomena of the time and reflected specific aspects of Russian society: Nikolai Berdyaev (1874–1948), Vladimir Bekhterev (1857–1927), Alexander Bogdanov (1873–1928), Nikolai Mikhailovsky (1842–1904), Georgi Plekhanov (1856–1918), Mikhail Reisner (1868–1928), and others) [1, 2, 8]. Having developed rapidly into the first decades of the twentieth century, social psychology in Russia practically disappeared for almost thirty years—from the 1930s to the 1960s—a result of state impact on the social sciences during the era of totalitarianism. Why was social psychology hit so hard, more than other areas of psychology? The explanation involves a paradox: social psychologists, striving to apply Marxism to the analysis of mass psychic phenomena, began to comprehend broad philosophical and methodological problems in their research, putting them in competition with the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology that relied on political rather than scientific foundations.

Thus, for ideological reasons, the development of social psychology in Russia was forcibly interrupted, and there was a hiatus in Russian social psychology from 1930 until the 1960s, that is, from the onset of totalitarianism until the “thaw” during the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev. By the time Soviet psychologists tried to overcome the isolation of Russian science, general psychology in Russia had already settled into a mono-methodological trend, based on the philosophy of Marxism and oriented towards natural-scientific methodology. Social psychology practically did not exist.

In the 1960s, in line with the “thaw” in ideology, there was some demand for the development of social psychology, to be built on two foundations:

- Conformity to the philosophical methodology of the official psychological “mainstream,” that is, Marxist Activity Theory, whose recognized leader at that time was A.N. Leontiev; and
- Learning from international research, i.e., foreign developments in the field of social psychology.

As recent Russian historians of psychology have noted, this dual basis for the development of Russian social psychology was implicitly contradictory and thus generated a number of discrepancies in the further development of the field, problems which have still not been well
identified and comprehended [8, 9]. Therefore, studies of the more influential figures in Soviet social psychology could contribute to better understanding of this problematic history.

The work of Boris Dmitrievitch Parygin (1930-2012) began in Leningrad (whose name later changed back to St. Petersburg) during the period of the “thaw.” In that difficult situation, his philosophical and sociological approach stands apart. In essence he was neither a Marxist nor a Westerner; rather, his work picked up on a trend that was developing in pre-Soviet Russia, which we now call the spiritual and moral trend in psychology, and which has itself revived during the post-Soviet period.

Parygin developed a holistic view of social psychology as a scientific system. In this unity, he considered general and particular issues of theory, methodology, and practical implementations. He consistently developed these ideas throughout his life, and they are reflected in his main monographs [4 - 7].

This presentation highlights this psychologist’s interactions with the dominant political ideology, as well as with Activity Theory, to reveal the spiritual and philosophical orientation of Parygin's methodology. Specifics of the structural-dynamic approach in Parygin’s general method of analysis are presented and illustrated, focusing on his theory of personality, to which Parygin gave the central place in his conception of social psychology [3].

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**Michael Pettit**  

Dual process theories currently exert a tremendous influence in both social science and public policy circles (Dow Schüll & Zaloom, 2011). Dual process theorists posit the existence of two reasoning systems: one fast, associative, automatic, unconscious; the other slow, rule-based, deliberative, conscious. Nobel-laureate Daniel Kahneman ranks among their most prominent advocate. He and Amos Tversky developed a research program focused on heuristics and biases which challenged expected utility theory in economics and more broadly the algorithmic, mechanical rationality of Cold War action intellectuals (Erickson et. al., 2013). Their work resonated with and bolstered the motivated cognition approach to social psychology and exercised considerable influence beyond psychology in the form of behavioral economics (Heukelom, 2014; Lewis, 2016). This recent attention to the automaticity of human thinking marks a break with Cold War cognition. It displaced the chess-playing computer as an analogy for the mind, positing instead human decision-makers as reactive, tribal beasts ruled by affective dispositions.

The history of "the affect heuristic" reorients existing narratives about the end of Cold War rationality. Kahneman made this heuristic the centerpiece of his Nobel address (2003), but it was not among the cognitive shortcuts he and Tversky first proposed in the 1970s. Reflecting the norms of Cold War cognitivism, their program was decidedly cool, focusing on the computational limits of the human mind to grasp probability. The availability and representativeness of information led to biased decisions, not its emotional color. The affect heuristic was only added to the taxonomy after 2000 (Slovic et. al., 2002; Kahneman & Fredrick, 2002). Yet, its reach quickly expanded. Kahneman understood much of System 1 (quick, automatic thinking) to fall under powerful affective dispositions. It signaled the arrival of a new hedonic psychology of decision-making organized around like/dislike, good/bad, pleasure/pain.

The affect heuristic grew out of nuclear dread, namely public opposition to the spread of domestic power plants. The mounting opposition reflected Cold War anxieties, new environmentalist sensibilities, and a growing distrust of government authority (Suri, 2009). Despite technical assessments demonstrating the safety of nuclear systems and the unlikelihood of accidents, a vocal minority of Americans organized against the expansion of domestic plants. By 1970s, this obstinate skepticism led federal regulators to abandon the model of an "informed and careful public" deliberating the value of a nuclear future. After the engineers and actuaries failed, they turned to psychologists to explain this intransigent irrationality.

Resistance proved particularly strong in Eugene, Oregon (Pope, 1990). This university town became a center for environmental, cooperative, and counterculture movements. With its
robust tradition for direct democracy using ballot initiatives dating back to the Progressive Era, "the Oregon System" made the tension between voters (publics) and bureaucrats (experts) particularly acute.

The nuclear controversy soon attracted a team of cognitive psychologist attached to the Oregon Research Institute (ORI): Paul Slovic, Sarah Lichtenstein, and Baruch Fischhoff. This team captured the polyvalence if not contradictions of the post-1960s social sciences. Lichtenstein and Slovic made their reputation with experiments designed to challenge the empirical basis of game theory. As researchers with no university affiliation, they depended upon the soft money provided by NSF grants and military contracts. The largess of the Cold War state allowed the ORI to flourish. At the same time, these scientists were active in the anti-war and feminist movements. These tensions led the team to break with the ORI in 1976 due to its anti-democratic organization and create an independent institute, Decision Research. Using members of the League of Women Voters as participants, the Oregon psychologists demonstrated how lay people’s risk perception had its own reasoning. Their “psychometric paradigm” showed how strong affective responses captured aspects of risk neglected by the expert's actuarial assessments. As the controversy over siting a national repository for nuclear waste grew, the Oregon team insisted on taking the public’s affective responses seriously as part of a deliberative consultancy process.

The political history of the affect heuristic reorients the recent history of the social sciences. The rise of dual process theories coincided with the end of consensus liberalism and the political polarization of the cultural wars. Indeed, there is a strong anti-democratic tenor to research on "nudges" and choice architecture for the global poor. By holding the ubiquity of cognitive biases together with the necessity of deliberative democracy, the Oregon group offers an important counter-history to these recent developments in the social sciences.

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**Benjamin Wegner**

**A Crisis of Spirit: How Philip Brickman Experienced and Confronted the 1970s Crisis in Social Psychology.**

“Has there been a crisis in social psychology? This can only be decided in retrospect by those people who can see what came after as well as what came before the period in question. The answer will necessitate deciding whether there was a break in the continuity of research or a breakdown in the assumptions governing research. I think it would be at the moment hard to prove that either has occurred. None the less, *there has undeniably been a crisis of spirit for at least some researchers*” [emphasis added] (Brickman, 1980, p. 5).

The curious thing about the crisis of social psychology that occurred during the 1970s is that some debate to what extent it even occurred. In her well-rounded exploration of the topic, Faye argues (2012) that yes, the discipline of social psychology faced multiple challenges: critiques of its experimental method; questions about its relevance for society; its lack of integrative theories; its implicit support of the status quo; and the probability that social psychology reflects its sociohistorical context, not timeless truths about human behavior. At the same time, there was not really a crisis, as Faye highlights how: the questions social psychology asked itself in the 1970s were not altogether new; the motif of “crisis” was not unique to psychology but saturated throughout American culture at the time; and the field appears to have moved beyond its so-called crisis without explicitly solving any of its existential questions. Before the discussion of social psychology’s “crisis” is closed, however, this paper implores historians of the social and behavioral sciences to consider at least one researcher who lived through the crisis and experienced it as such. The social psychologist Philip Brickman is most associated with his study on lottery winners and accident victims, and his concept of “the hedonic treadmill”. Before dying of suicide in 1982 at the age of 38, Brickman performed innovative research on a wide range of topics including helping and coping, commitment, justice, and happiness. In his 1980 book chapter, “A Social Psychology of Human Concerns,” Brickman confronted the crisis of psychology head-on, formulating a robust re-definition of the field that fuses intellectual with ethical concerns. This paper will unpack Brickman’s social psychology of
human concerns, a work that resembles a dialectical form of positive psychology that
incorporates the good and bad aspects of human existence, several years before the phrase
“positive psychology” emerged.

This paper stems from my dissertation, a psychobiography of Brickman which analyzes
his life, his work, and the relationship between the two. This paper introduces readers to the life
and work of Philip Brickman, and details how he experienced the crisis in social psychology. For
instance, archival evidence shows how Philip’s estranged partner made similar critiques of his
profession as the National Science Foundation: that it wasn’t producing useful knowledge for the
benefit of society. Brickman, a consummate researcher and a sensitive human being, took these
critiques to heart; it was one of many factors that contributed to his suicide. Let us not forget the
people who experience a historical crisis in their own lived experience, and who attempted to
overcome personal and collective challenges through research. The researchers who underwent
social psychology’s so-called crisis five decades ago appear to have something useful to say,
perhaps even for a more contemporary crisis.

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Sam Parkovnick
William McDougall and Psychoanalysis.

William McDougall’s hormic psychology and psychoanalysis hold that behavior is purposive
and posit an instinctive basis to behavior (McDougall, 1936). Despite this, psychoanalysis is,
explicitly in its early versions and essentially in all versions, a uni-instinctive theory which
explains behavior in terms of sexuality while hormic psychology does so in terms of numerous
instincts (Jones, 1927; Pasouskas, 1993).
McDougall read a great deal of Sigmund Freud’s publications (McDougall, 1936) and published extensively on psychoanalysis in *Outline of Abnormal Psychology* (1926), *Psycho-Analysis and Social Psychology* (1936), and numerous other publications. Freud discussed McDougall’s *The Group Mind* (1920) in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921) and Ernest Jones reviewed McDougall’s *Outline of Psychology* (1923) and *Outline of Abnormal Psychology* (1926) in the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, in 1924 and 1927, respectively.

Differences were about recognition and which instinct-based psychology would dominate as well as about the nature of an instinct-based psychology. McDougall wanted to incorporate what was useful in psychoanalysis into hormic psychology (McDougall, 1936); he objected to Freud’s lack of attention to and recognition of McDougall’s contribution to psychology (McDougall, 1925), the exception being Freud’s *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921). Freud and Jones were concerned by the lack of recognition of psychoanalysis by academic psychologists (Jones, 1925a; 1925b). This was, of course, not the case with McDougall. Regarding McDougall, their objection was to what he had to say about psychoanalysis and the emotion that accompanied it (Jones, 1925a; Pasouskas, 1993).

The paper will begin to fill in the relationship between McDougall and psychoanalysis, something historians have paid little attention to. It will also take issue with a noteworthy recent exception, Ben Shephard in *Headhunters: The Search for a Science of Mind* (2014). Shephard holds that McDougall’s take on psychoanalysis changed to be negative in 1914 in the 8th edition of McDougall’s *An Introduction to Social Psychology*. The reality, as this paper will show, was that McDougall was always of two minds regarding psychoanalysis, on one hand praising Freud and psychoanalysis and on the other hand being quite critical of psychoanalysis. Shephard also holds that the April, 1910 issue of the *American Journal of Psychology* which included articles by Sigmund Freud, Carl Jung, Ernest Jones, and Sandor Ferenczi introduced British and American academics and doctors to psychoanalysis. The reality was that, though the issue may have introduced some to psychoanalysis in America, other important, and perhaps more important, factors included Freud’s visit to Clark University in 1909 (Rosenzweig, 1992), the work of Ernest Jones and A. A. Brill (Ross, 1972), as well as other earlier publications in American periodicals including one by James Jackson Putnam as early as 1906.

Shephard was silent regarding McDougall’s introduction to psychoanalysis. McDougall’s first published reference to psychoanalysis was in “Instinct and Intelligence” in the July, 1910 issue of the *British Journal of Psychology*, so it is possible that the April, 1910 issue of the *American Journal of Psychology* did introduce him to psychoanalysis. It is also possible that McDougall’s introduction to psychoanalysis was through another issue of the *American Journal of Psychology*, or another journal, book, or person for that matter, one possibility being one of the editions of *Studies in the Psychology of Sex* by Havelock Ellis (cf., Ellis, 1906). And the issue is not simply and only what introduced McDougall to psychoanalysis; it is at least as importantly the competition between McDougall’s hormic psychology and psychoanalysis for recognition in psychology.
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Kenneth Feigenbaum


This presentation contextualizes Abraham H. Maslow in his living space at Brandeis University from 1962 through 1965. It is based upon my personal experience and on the research I performed on the history of the Psychology Department. Applicants to the Ph.D degree viewed
the Department as an exemplar of a one promoting the ideology of Humanistic Psychology. In fact, Humanistic Psychology was only one area of inquiry in an eclectic department.

As a memoir this presentation may have some value as an eyewitness, most importantly in the fleeting memories I have of Abe Maslow. There are very few persons alive that still retain memories of Maslow. I am one of the few. Whether my memories add anything to the understanding of the man and his work may be debated. An excellent biography of Maslow (Hoffman, 1988) already exists. Also, I am aware of the pitfalls of eye-witnesses (Loftus, 1996) and that memories are not isomorphic to historical truth (Spence, 1982).

The memories that I will present include the following:

1. Being hired to be the “messiah” to save the undergraduate teaching program which had lost some of its “intellectual libido”.
2. Maslow’s views as to what the Department should represent which changed from his earliest days in the Department. How his views limited the opportunities for grants and internships in clinical settings.
3. Maslow’s relationship with the other Psychology faculty members and his relationships with faculty members in other Departments.
4. Maslow’s relationships with the graduate students
5. Maslow’s political stances including the “firing” of two Anthropology Department members who were positive toward Fidel Castro
6. Maslow’s attitude toward women as full time graduate students.
7. The “false trade” between George Kelly at Ohio State and Kenneth Feigenbaum at Brandeis.

My research related to the history of the Psychology Department will include:

1. Maslow’s reputation with his undergraduate students based on a survey I conducted.
2. The role of Maslow as a Dissertation advisor from 1958 to 1970.

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